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COMMENTS AND RESEARCH REPORTS
SOME REFLECTIONS ON CRITICIZING THE COURTS AND
"POLICING THE POLICE"
YALE KAMISAR*
This comment is a concluding paper by Professor Kamisar concerning an article by Professor Fred
E. Inbau of the Northwestern University School of Law entitled "Public Safety v. Individual Civil
Liberties: The Prosecutor's Stand," which appeared in the March, 1962, issue of the Journal(Vol. 53,
No. 1) at pp. 85-89. Professor Kamisar replied to the Inbau article in the June, 1962, number of the
Journal (Vol. 53, No. 2) at pp. 171-93. Professor Inbau's rebuttal to the Kamisar response appeared
in the September, 1962, number of the Journal(Vol. 53, No. 3) at pp. 329-32. Comments from readers
concerning these articles appeared in the June, 1962, number (Vol. 53, No. 2) at pp. 231-32; further
letters concerning this exchange of views appear in the "Reader Comments" section of the present
issue.-EDITOR.
"[Rlecent years have seen a recurrence of that
old storm of criticism of the Supreme Court
which seems to renew itself in our history every
twenty years or so. The main lines of the attack,
whether by lawman or layman, have had a quiet
consistency. The underlying beat is always: 'I
don't like these results!' And that underlying
drumbeat is commonly, though not always,
masked by noise about how the Supreme Court
(or the members thereof) are abandoning their
Constitutional function, usurping legislative
power, disrupting our commonwealth, and this
or that in addition. Marshall's court got this
treatment; Taney .... And here we are again." t

We need the relatively few professors we have
with Fred Inbau's rich background in law enforcement work and tough, earthy approach to problems of criminal procedure and constitutional law.
* The author is Professor of Law in the University of
Minnesota Law School. He is also a member of the
Advisory Committee on the Revision of the Minnesota
Criminal Law. In 1960-1961, Professor Kamisar was a
Social Science Research Council Fellow, studying the
prosecutor's discretion in the State of Minnesota and
the substantive criminal law "in practice." Prior to
joining the faculty of the University of Minnesota in
1957, he was engaged in the practice of law in Washington, D. C.

t LLEWELLYN, THE COMMuON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS 384 (1960). For a brief but incisive
discussion of the passions roused by Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); and Ex
parle MiUlligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); "but a few
of the violent controversies which swirled about the

"We say we believe in law. We dedicate a day to
its honor, by formal proclamation of our President.... Yet, day by day, we hear many voices
that seem to be subversive of law ....We have,
in America, given a new exaltation to the power
'of the judiciary. We have accorded to
our courts
the power to invalidate the acts of those who are
more directly responsible to the people's will.
Both de Toqueville and Bryce have remarked
that in our polity scarcely a question arises
which does not become, sooner or later, a subject of judicial debate.... What is important
is that we recognize the additional stresses to
which our system subjects our courts, and, in
the sense in which we now use it, our law. Our
judges personify law and the rule of law. We owe
them the same honor we owe the law itself." t"
I don't think Professor Inbau would deny that he
is "prosecution minded," but surely more of his
teaching brethren are "defense minded." If he
finds it difficult to set aside the question of the
guilt or innocence of a particular individual and
focus solely upon the procedural and constitutional
features of the case, others sometimes find it difficult to take into account considerations of police
efficiency and public security. If he dwells too long
heads of the Justices of the Supreme Court during the
first century of its existence," see McGowan, The
Supreme Court in the American ConstitutionalSystem:
The Problem in Historical Perspective,33 Nont DMmE
LAw. 527, 532-43 (1958).
ft Horsky, Law Day: Some Reflections on Current
Proposals to Curtail the Supreme Court, 42 MmN. L.
REv. 1105, 1106-08 (1958). See also McGowan, supra,
at 540-43.
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on the "needs" of the policeman-virtually to the human liberty, "it is now the keeper, not of the
exclusion of all other values and policies-others nation's property, but of its conscience. ' 9 Whether
sometimes forget that constitutional guarantees or not this was always so, in the past decade a
"ought not to be an obstacle in a game but only a majority of the Court has heeded the warning that
protection against arbitrary and capricious police "federalism should not be raised to the plane of an
action," that "if the rules make sense in the light absolute, nor the Bill of Rights ... reduced to a
of a policeman's task, we will be in a stronger precatory trust."'10 More and more, the Court has
come to realize that to the peoples of the world
position to insist that he obey them."'
Professor Inbau's law enforcement background "the criminal procedure sanctioned by any of our
and police-prosecution perspective were put to states is the procedure sanctioned by the United
good use in his famous 1948 article, "The Confes- States."" Surely and steadily, "the national ideal
' 2
sion Dilemma in the Supreme Court. ' 2 It has de- is prevailing over state orientation.
servedly been called an "important" contribution
In the meantime, how has Professor Inbau
reacted to all this?
to the literature.3 But 1948 was a long time ago-I regret to say that his voice has grown louder
in this business.
Then the McNabb rule looked as if it might be and harsher. This is understandable, if not excustottering; it has since been twice reaffirmed. 4 By able. It has always been easier for winners to be
then, the Court had already banned "dry run" more gracious than losers. And Inbau must have
hangings, beatings, and other crude practices on realized some time ago that he is taking a "somewhat lonely position, '"" that he is fighting a losing
the part of state officers, but as torture and terror
became outmoded and were displaced by more -if not a lost-cause. Convinced that a major
factor accounting for the stream of decisions
subtle interrogation pressures, the area was marked
against his views is "the neglect or failure of the
by uncertainty. There is little uncertainty now;
for a number of recent state confession cases has police and prosecution to present adequately...
[their] side of the issue,"' 4 and evidently deterseen a vigilant Court outlaw much "psychological
5
mined to remedy the matter, it is not too surpriscoercion," as well as physical violence.
ing that Professor Inbau has mistaken intemperateBack in 1948, the Supreme Court had not yet
ness for articulateness.
ruled that the security of one's privacy against
unreasonable search and seizure was binding on the
CRITICIZING THE COURT
states through the due process clause; 6 it has since
held that not only are these guarantees applicable
Of course, I find nothing unprofessional or
to the states but that they must be enforced
unlawyerlike in anybody's criticism of the Court
against them by means of the same sanction used
for having overruled Wolf v. Colorado."s How could
against the federal government--exclusion of the
I? I was one of the many who criticized the Court
7
illegally seized evidence. If more examples of the
for not overruling the Wolf case. 16 But criticism
imposition of national standards on state criminal
comes in different sizes and varieties.
proceedings are needed, in certain situations the
It is one thing to differ with the Court about
states are now required to furnish all indigent
what the law is or ought to be; it is quite another
prisoners with a free trial transcript or an adequate thing to deny that the Court has the power or the right
substitute."
Today, the course of the Court is clear. Once
9 Lewis, Historic Change in the Supreme Court, New
Times Magazine, June 17, 1962, p. 7.
concerned with property rights much more than York
10Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, 36
I Paulsen, Safeguardsin the Law of Search and Seizure,

52 Nw. U.L. REv. 65, 66 (1957).

243 ILL. L. REV. 442.
3 McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE 241 n.1 (1954).
4 Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S.

410 (1948)
(decided after the Inbau article); Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
5E.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961);
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Fikes v.
Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
6 Of course, it was to do so the following year, in
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
7 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

N.Y.U.L. REV. 761, 774 (1961).
n Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure,
70 HARv. L. REv. 1, 26 (1956).
12 Lewis, supra note 9, at 7.
11Cf. McGarr, The Exclusionary Ride: An Ill-Conceived and Ineffective Remedy, 52 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S.
2664 (1961).
lInbau, The Social and Ethical Requirements of
Criminal Investigation and Prosecution, 3 CRIm. L. Q.

(Canada) 329, 350 (1960).

15338 U.S. 25 (1949).
16 Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal
State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L.
REV. 1083 (1959).
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to say what the law is. The court needs and welcomes
criticism possessing "that quality of judiciousness
which is demanded of the Court itself"; 7 the profession and the public can get along quite nicely
without the kind that "fans the fires of lawlessness
and cynicism... ignited in the wake of the school
desegregation cases,"' 8 and without the kind that
"offers comfort to anyone who claims legitimacy
in defiance of the courts."' 9 I leave it to the reader
to label Professor Inbau's brand of criticism. Here
are some samples:
"We are not only neglecting to take adequate
measures against the criminal element; we are
actually facilitating their activities in the form
of what I wish to refer to as 'turn 'em loose'
court decisions and legislation. To be sure, such
decisions and legislation are not avowedly for the
purpose of lending aid and comfort to the criminal element, but the effect is the same....
"What particularly disturbs me, and I am
sure many of you, is the dangerous attitude that
has been assumed by the United States Supreme
Court. The Court has taken it upon itself, without
constitutionalauthorization,to police the police.""
"[The overruling of Wolf v. Colorado is] just
another example of the Court's continuing
efforts to police the police-and that isan executive, or at most a legislative function of government. It certainly is not the constitutional function of the judiciary.""1
"[T]he reason is perhaps more disturbing than
the individual case decisions themselves.
"It has become all too fashionable in judicial
circles to line up 'on the liberal side.' In their
zeal to become 'great judges' the formula seems
to be, with some who harbour that aspiration,
either adopt a 'turn 'em. loose' policy or count
yourself out as a great judge."n
"The courts have no right to police the police....
Furthermore, the courts have enough troubles
of their own. Witness what goes on in some of
7

1 FRuN, The Court and Its Critics, in TE
PREmE CoURT or =HEUNrrED STATES 177 (1961).

Su-

Id. at 172.
WEcnsrza, Toward Neutral Principles of Conslitutional Law, in PRNmcIPLEs, PoLiTIcs AND FUNDAmENTAL LAw 47 (1961).
20Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties:
The Prosecutor'sStand, 53 J. CiR. L., C. & P.S. 85
(1962). (Keynote address at the 1961 Annual Conference of the National District Attorneys' Association.)
(Emphasis added.)
2"tId. at 86-87.
2'Inbau, The Social and Ethical Requirements of
Criminal Investigation and Prosecution, 3 Caus. L. Q.
(Canada) 329 (1960). (Emphasis added.)

the municipal or magistrate courts of our large
cities. In my opinion there are, in such courts,
more hurts to the innocent and more trampling
over of the basic individual civil liberties and
ethical considerations than you will find in most
police departments. Much of the concern, energy,
and efforts that the courts expend with respect to
police conduct could be better spent on getting their
own house in order."
In his "reply," appearing in the preceding issue
of the Journal, Professor Inbau is a good deal
more restrained than he has been in other recent
writings. But he still cannot resist challenging,
once again, the right of the High Court to tell the
people of Michigan that the "proximate solution"
they worked out for the search and seizure problem
must be set aside, the right of the Court to tell the
people of that state that their judgment must be
overridden.'
I am not sure I fully understand such talk. If
the Supreme Court lacks such a right, how does
it ever declare state executive and legislative
action or state constitutional provisions in violation of the federal constitution? Can it be that
Inbau still resists the idea of constitutional review
by an independent judiciary? Can it be that he
still insists that "no society is democratic unless it
has a government of unlimited powers, and that
no government is democratic unless its legislature
[or its citizenry] has unlimited powers"?'- Can it be
that he still disputes the proposition that "there
are some phases of American life which should be
beyond the reach of any majority, save by [federal] constitutional amendment"? 6 That due process rights "depend on the outcome of no elections"? 27 Can it be-at this late date--that Inbau
is petitioning for rehearing in Marburyv. Madison2 '
and Fletcher v. Pcck?2
In his "reply," Professor Inbau tells us: "I am
opposed to illegal police searches and seizures, but
I do not believe that the United States Supreme
Court had the right to order the states to free
guilty persons merely because the police had acted
illegally in obtaining the evidence of guilt."'
231d.
at 350-51.
24
1nbau, More About Public Safety v. Individual
Liberties, 53 J.CRim. L., C. & P.S. 329, 329-30 (1962).
2 An argument disposed of in Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. Rnv.
193, 199 (1952).
26Id. at 197.
'lJackson, J.,in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
2"5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
30Inbau, supra note 24, at 332.
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I realize you put a certain "punch" into your
criticism when you phrase it in terms of the Court
orderingthe states to free the guilty. But the Court
issues no such orders. Exclusion of the evidence, of
course, does not necessarily free a particular defendant. On remand, he can still be-and he has
been-convicted on properly obtained evidence, if
there is such evidence and it is sufficient.
I am aware, too, that a complaint carries an
extra "wallop" when you talk about the Court
overturning state convictions "merely because the
police.., acted illegally." The only trouble is that
the Court doesn't upset state convictions unless the
police acted unconstitutionally, i.e., in violation of
due process. There is a difference. For example,
despite the "impressively pervasive [state] requirement" that arrested persons be promptly
arraigned, 31 "the majority of the Court have
steadily rejected the argument that the securing of
the confession during a period When the prisoner's
detention was illegal because of failure to produce
him promptly for a preliminary hearing is of itself
a sufficient basis for overturning the conviction on
2
due process grounds."
As I translate Professor Inbau, then, what he is
saying is this: I am opposed to unreasonable
searches and seizures, but I do not believe the
Supreme Court has the right to reverse a state
conviction and remand for a new trial merely
because the first conviction was based on evidence
obtained by the police in violation of the federal
constitution. Somehow, when you put it that way,
his position seems to lose some of its appeal,
doesn't it?
The next time Professor Inbau feels the need to
3
warn the courts-and even the legislatures -to
leave the police alone, he should consider that "the
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root idea of the Constitution" has been said to be34
"that man can be free because the state is not.
The next time he feels the urge to protest that the
Court has gone beyond its constitutionally authorized functions he should consider the post-Baker v.
Carr35 remarks of the U. S. Attorney General:
"When people criticize the courts for invading
spheres of action which supposedly belong to other
parts of our constitutional system, they often
overlook the fact that the courts must act precisely
because the other organs of government have
failed to fulfill their own responsibilities.""6 The
next time he feels compelled to lash out at the
Court for its indulgence in judicial legislation, he
should consider the observation of Chief Justice
Walter Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court:
"That [U.S. Supreme Court] decisions are creative
seems to me unavoidable, particularly in a developing area of the law. To a court the common
denominator of all cases is that they must be
decided. The decision that lets a conviction stand
may be quite as creative as that which strikes one
down. It, too, becomes a precedent, and so shapes
the law of the future."3
"POLICING THE POLICE"

Professor Inbau insists that decisions dealing
with the problems of arrest, search and seizure,
and interrogation constitute "policing the police." 36
3

Rostow, supra note 25, at 195.

35369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that the federal

judiciary can hear cases involving the apportionment
of state legislative seats).
36 Remarks of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy,
quoted in Lewis, Historic Change in the Supreme Court,
New York Times Magazine, June 17, 1962, pp. 7, 38.
"ISchaefer, supra note 13, at 6. (Emphasis added.)
The author also points out, id. at 4, that "we problems
which are vital today were not presented to the Court
31McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,343 (1943).
until recently," e.g., the right to counsel in 1932, the
McCoRMcK, EVIDENcE 245 (1954). For more admissibility of a coerced confession in 1936. He
recent discussions of the problem see Mueller, The observes, too, that "the lateness of these decisions
Law Relating to Police Interrogation Privileges and cannot be explained on the theory that the Court was
originally reluctant to decide such cases. Apparently the
Limitations, 52 J. Cmu. L., C. & P. S. 2, 7-8 (1961);
question simply did not reach the Court." Ibid.
Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A
"IIn a footnote supporting his criticism of Mapp v.
Skeptical View, 52 J. CRns. L., C. & P.S. 21, 28-31
(1961).
Ohio, Professor Inbau assures us, Inbau, supra note 24,
As an astute commentator has recently observed,
at 330n.6: "In this connection, I should also like to
point out that when I say that the Supreme Court has
"in most instances the [state] courts have not even
discussed whether in-custody investigation by the no right to police the police, I have some company in
police is legal"; they "have not needed to mark out the the person of Mr. Justice Harlan. See his dissent in Rea
boundaries of proper police conduct short of that
v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 218 (1956)."
I submit that the reference to Justice Harlan "in
extreme characterized as coercion." Barrett, Police
to
Release
or
Charge,
this connection" is, at the very least, misleading. Rea
Practicesand the Law--From Arrest
was an extraordinary case which found a majority of
50 CATAE. L. Rxv. 11, 22 (1962). This article, unfortunately not yet in print when I wrote my first "reply"
the Court voting to enjoin a federal agent from giving,
in a state prosecution, evidence which he had obtained
to Professor Inbau, is an extraordinarily thoughtful,
in the course of an illegal federal search. Justice Harlan
careful, and dispassionate treatment of a very explosive
voiced doubts that "the federal courts share with the
subject.
3 See, e.g., Inbau, supra note 20, at 88-89.
executive branch of the Government responsibility for
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I prefer to call it enforcing the Constitution. Of
course, here as elsewhere, the question of the
Court's power and responsibility cannot be resolved by "little more than a play upon words.""
Whatever one calls it, I think judicial intervention
in these troublesome areas is more justifiable, more
appropriate, than in most other fields. For here
"the Court has put its emphasis on procedure, on
due process in the primary meaning of the conhas special compecept, for which the judiciary
'40
tence and responsibility.
A close student of the man and his work has
observed that a main characteristic of Justice
Brandeis was "an insistence on jurisdictional and
procedural observances" and a "respect for the
spheres of competence of other organs of authority." 4" Thus, in the celebrated case of Internaaz
tiotal News Service v. Associated Press Brandeis
"had been willing, indeed insistent, that the
inequities of the competitive struggle be left for
resolution by the legislature, lest the Court do an
ill-considered job."4 Yet, the Brandeis dissent in
the Olmstead case" has well been called "a locus
classicus on the theme of the dynamism of the
law."' 5 Why this apparent departure from his
general philosophy? Those who deny that the
supervising law enforcement activities as such," 350
U.S. at 218 (Emphasis added.) He pointed to and
relied on this language in McNabb (a case that has
dismayed Inbau, but which Harlan voted to reaffirm
in Mallory): "We are not concerned with law enforcement practices except in so far as courts themselves
become instruments of law enforcement," 350 U.S. at
218-29, quoting from 318 U.S. at 347. (Emphasis
added.) How, then, does the Rea dissent give aid and
comfort to Professor Inbau? He denies the right of the
judiciary to "police the police" in cases such as McNabb
and Mapp where the courts were instruments of law
enforcement.
n Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (19.62).
40 FRUND, op. cit. supra note 17, at 180. See also
Newman, The Processof Prescribing"Due Process," 49
CALIF. L. Rxv. 215, 236 (1961): "Procedure (the kind
of procedure that is used to deprive people of life,
liberty, and property) is peculiarly a lawyer's topic.
In other fields there are businessmen and churchmen'
and doctors and engineers for whom lawyers speak."
41FREUND, Portraitof a Liberal Judge: Mr. Justice
Brandeis, in THE SUPREoME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 119-20, 126-27 (1961).
- 248 U.S. 215 (1918). The majority held that a
company which gathers news has a quasi property in
the results of its enterprise, as against a competitor.
43 FR UN, op. cit. supra note 41, at 134.
44 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471
(1928). The majority held that telephone wires and
messages passing over them are not within the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure.
4 FREm, op. cit. supranote 41, at 133.

Court has the power or the responsibility to "police
the police" would do well to consider the reasons
advanced for Brandeis's activism in Olmstead:
"In this case the responsibility of the Court
was inescapable. The issue involved the basic
processes of government as they impinge on the
individual against whom the forces of the law
are brought to bear... [Tlhe processes of the
criminal law had been applied to the individual,
and no agency of government more appropriate
than the Court could be expected to resolve the
contest between public power and personal
' 4
immunity."
In his "reply," Professor Inbau once again comes
out bravely for better police selection and training
and more pay.47 As if this were really an issue! Of
course, I agree with him. We need these things
badly.
But why must better methods of selection and
promotion and proper training and compensation
afford "the only real, practically attainable protection ... against police abuses of individual
rights and liberties"? 48 Why does the issue have to
be framed in terms of better pay and training
versus the exclusionary rules? Why can't we have
both?
There is impressive evidence--which Inbau
does not attempt to refute-that we can and we
should. There is impressive evidence in the two
jurisdictions which have held the spotlight in
recent years-the State of California and the District of Columbia-that the exclusionary rules
have stimulated intensive police training in the
law of arrest, interrogation, and search and seizure
and led to more thorough and exact police work
generally. 9 In California, the Cahan decision has
also evoked extensive new legislation, in many
respects codifying, clarifying, and streamlining the
48Id. at 133-34. For a similar conclusion about
Justice Brandeis, based on other Brandeis opinions,
see FELILMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHrs 5-6 (1958).
47Inbau, supra note 24, at 332.

(Emphasis added)
See the testimony of law enforcement officers
collected in Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and"Theories," 53 J. Cum. L., C. &
P.S. 171, 179-81, 191-92 (1962).
As the author of the Cahanopinion recently observed,
the exclusionary rule has not "engendered the problems" about lawful and unlawful police conduct in
search and seizure, but merely "tardily excavated them
from the oubliettes where lie the stifled problems of the
law. So long as illegally ,obtained evidence remained
admissible in many states there was little motivation
for full-scale inquiry." Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large
in the Fifty States, 1962 Durr L. J. 319, 321.
4Ibid.
4
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laws of arrest and search and seizure 10-another
Inbau objective.
I can see how improvements in police selection,
training, leadership and tradition would strengthen
the case for judicial review. Court opinions are
more likely to be "wasted" on indifferent, insensitive police departments; more apt to exert a constructive influence on good departments, more
apt to stir thought and action when quality and
training are high. But I fail to see how better pay,
selection, and training would eliminate the need for
judicial review.
As an astute commentator has observed:
"Order is not to be exalted at the cost of
liberty, and so even the best selected and best
trained and best disciplined police forces must
be subjected to incessant scrutiny, exacting
criticism, and rigorous control.... It is quite
true, of course, that eternal vigilance is the price
of liberty. But it is imperative to remember that
the vigilance demanded by this maxim means
vigilance against duly constituted authorityagainst the forces of order."51

Court-and badly split it. (Professor Inbau neglects
to point out that only five of the nine justices "adhered to the former viewpoint" in the first place.)
Not until 1949 did a bare majority of the Court
perform the remarkable feat of "simultaneously
creating a constitutional right and denying the
most effective remedy for violation of that right."M
Not until 1949 did the Court hold that one may be
executed or imprisoned on the basis of evidence
obtained in violation of due process and yet, somehow, not be deprived of life or liberty without due
55
process.
The Wolf case and Professor Inbau's shock and
dismay at its overruling a decade later well illustrate, I think, how "today's new and startling
decision quickly becomes a coveted anchorage for
new vested interests.

'1 56

In bemoaning the fate of Wolf, Professor Inbau
exudes a considerable reverence for the principle of
stare decisis. He has not always felt this way. There
was a time when he urged the Court to overrule
the McNabb case, adding that "in any event, the
least the Court should do short of an abandonment
of the McNabb rule itself is to ...establish a new

STARE DECISIS IN PARTICULAR AND "NEUTRAL
PRINCIPLES" IN GENERAL

In his "reply," Professor Inbau emphasizes that
"all along the Court had considered the exclusionary rule to be only a rule of evidence; it did not
evolve into a due process requirement until the 6
to 3 decision in Mapp v. Ohio on June 19, 19 6 1."2
He dwelt at some length on this point in his earlier
commentary this year:
"For nwany years the United States Supreme
Court held that state courts and state legislatures were at full liberty to accept or reject the
exclusionary rule.... The Court said so as
recently as 1949 in Wolf v. Colorado.... Now...

the Court holds that if a state admits such evidence it is a violation of due process!
"After all these years... the Court... suddenly labels the rule to be a requirement of due
process. Of little comfort is the fact that three
of the nine justices ...adhered td the former
'
viewpoint."H
This I am afraid, is another example of Inbau's
soapboxmanship.
Not until 1949 did the issue squarely face the
50 See Kamisar, supra note 49, at 180 n. 78.
51
BARTH, THE PRicE or LIBERTY 193 (1961).
55 Inbau, supra note 24, at 330. (Emphasis added)
3Inbau, supra note 20, at 86-87. (Emphasis added)

rule somewhat midway between... [the federal
rule] and the conventional voluntary-trustworthy
test of admissibility."57 On the same occasion, he
implored the Court "at the earliest opportunity,
[to] reconsider the 'inherent coercion' rule [formum Perlman, Due Process and the Admissibility of
Evidence, 64 HARv. L. REV. 1304 (1951).
5 One federal district judge tried hard to explain
Wolf this way: "An unreasonable search by a state
agent or official is not such a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment as will invoke operation of that Amendment." Mackey v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 579, 581
(W.D.S.C. 1957). (Emphasis added)
Mr. Justice Frankfurter was badly plagued by his
own Wolf opinion when he dissented from the 5-4
majority opinion in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128
(1954) (affirming a conviction based on evidence
obtained as a result of Los Angeles police planting
microphones in petitioner's hall, bedroom, and bedroom
closet.) As Professor Francis Allen has observed:
"[T]he Court had apparently treated the police behavior in Wolf as violating the defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment rights; that is to say, rights 'basic to a

free society' ..... To label a right 'basic to a free
society' is to say about as much as can be said. Yet
Wolf refused to vindicate these rights by reversal of the
conviction. Given Wolf, how are the rights flouted by
the Los Angeles police in Irvine to be characterized?

There is a certain inelegance in speaking of rights 'very

basic to a free society' or in indulging in what appears

to be almost a comparison of superlatives." Allen,
Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for
Wolf,
1961 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 9.
5
6Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 CoLm. L. REv. 735,
737 (1949).

57Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United
States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442, 463 (1948).
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lated and applied in the famous Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process confession case of Ashcraft v. Tenessee,8] ... and substitute a rule which
will be more intelligible and administratively
practicable." 59
Indeed, at the very time he laments the Court's
departure from precedent in Mapp, Professor
Inbau cannot resist trotting out the standard
arguments for overruling the Weeks rule of exclusion in federal search and seizure cases6'-and
that goes back a full half century! I am sure Professor Inbau would not suppress his glee if Weeks
were overturned, or if the "rule of automatic
reversal" in coerced confession cases, first formulated by the Stone Court, met a similar fate."' Or
2
the rule articulated in Gouled v. United States,
some 40 years ago, that objects of "evidentary
value only" are beyond the reach of an otherwise
valid warrant. Or Rochin, the famous "stomach
pumping" case.6 '
Only when he likes a decided case, e.g., Wolf v.
Colorado,does Professor Inbau manage to "acquire
an acute conservatism" in the status quo. 65 When
he is unhappy about the way a case was decided,
Inbau, it seems, does agree that after all "it is the
Constitution which [a Supreme Court Justice]
swore to support and defend, not the gloss which
his precedessors may have put on it."" When he
dislikes a particular precedent, Inbau, it seems,
does recognize that a Justice formulating his view
cannot do otherwise but "reject some earlier ones
as false... unless he lets men long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in which he lives
67
do his thinking for him.'
In short, Professor Inbau's notion of stare decisis
appears to run along these lines: It is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled
than it be settled right (1) especially when you
think it was "settled right," e.g., Wolf; (2) except
when you think it was "settled wrong," e.g.,
- 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
59Inbau, supra note 57, at 463. (Emphasis added)
See also id. at 447.
10Inbau, supra note 20, at 86.
1Id. at 87. See the commentary on Inbau's criticism
of this rule in Kamisar, supra note 49, at 173.
255 U.S. 298, 309-11 (1921).
61Inbau, supra note 20, at 87. See the commentary
on Inbau's criticism in Kamisar, supra note 49, at 177.
c4 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). For a
critical view of this case, see Inbau, The Per-ersion of
Science in Criminal and Personnel Investigations, 43
J. Canm. L., C. & P.S. 128 (1952).
65Douglas, supra note 56, at 737.
66 Id. at 736.
'7Ibid.

McNabb, Ashcraft, Gouled. Of course, once the
decision to invoke the principle of stare decisis
turns on whether the case to be overruled "seems
to hinder or advance the interests or values" you
support, you no longer have a principle-it has
been "reduced to a manipulative tool."'"
Mapp and Wolf deal with Fourteenth Amendment Due Process cases. This is hardly the battleground to make a brave stand for stare decisis.
The Justice who told us that "in most matters it is
more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than that it be settled right,"' 9 also told us:
"But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action
is practically impossible, this Court has often
overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows
to the lessons of experience and the force of
better reasoning. ..."70
I think the post-Wolf years contained some
valuable lessons of experience.
For a long, long time opponents of the exclusionary rule have been telling us that the criminal
should not go free merely because "the constable
has blundered."' But this argument loses a good
deal of its force when we are confronted with the
Chief of Police-approved illegality that characterized the recent cases of Irvine v.Californian2 and
'2WECHSLER,

Toward Neutral Principles of Con-

stlituional Law, in PRINCIPLES,
MENTAL LAW 17, 21 (1961).

POLITICS AND FUNDA-

0 Brandeis, J., dissenting in Burnet v. Colorado, 285
U.S. 393, 406 (1932). (Emphasis added)
70 Id. at 406-08. See also Davis, The Future of JudgeMade Public Law in England: A Problem of Practical
Jurisprudence, 61 CoLum. L. Rav. 201, 215 (1961):
"IT]he need for logical symmetry and consistency is a
variable. In real property law and in many portions of
commercial law, certainty and predictability are
primary needs.... But on problems of public law,
which at any given time are especially difficult, creating
law that will benefit living people is far more important
than that the law be settled. Therefore, on most matters
of public law, being governed by the ideas of men long
dead is unsatisfactory and may be even abominable."
7'E.g., Cardozo, J., in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y.
13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
' 347 U.S. 128 (1954). The Chief Justice and Justice
Jackson took the position that a copy of the Irvine
opinion-setting forth the "almost incredible" invasions of petitioner's privacy-should be sent to the
United States Attorney General for his attention, id.
at 138. The Attorney General did conduct an investigation, the results of which disclosed that "the police
officers who placed the detectograph or microphone in
Irvine's home were acting under orders of the Chief of
Police, who in turn was acting with the full knowledge
of the local District Attorney." Letter of Feb. 15, 1955,
from Warren Olney III, then Assistant United States
Attorney General, on file with the Stanford Law Review,
reprinted in part in Comment, 7 STAN. L.REv. 76, 94
n.75 (1954).
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People v. Cahan;73 and the deliberate, calculated
illegality that accounts for systematic police raids
and round-ups? 4
In the course of overruling precedents of more
than thirty years standing to adopt the exclusionary rule of 1955, the California Supreme Court,
per Traynor, J., observed:
"[W]ithout fear of criminal punishment or
other discipline, law enforcement officers, sworn
to support the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of California, frankly
admit their deliberate flagrant acts in violation
of both Constitutions. ...

It is dearly apparent

from their testimony that they casually regard
- 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). See Paulsen,

Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw.

U.L. R v. 65, 75-76 (1957).
Professor John Barker Waite, a sharp critic of the
exclusionary rule for at least 30 years, has adapted remarkably to new events. Thus, in his latest writing, he
expresses annoyance at the Cahan court because it
"disapproved use of the dictaphones despite... the
authorization by the police chief." Waite, The Legal
Approach to Crime and Correction, 23 LAw & CoNTEmp.
PROB. 594, 601 (1958). (Emphasis added) This is not
the first time opponents of the exclusionary rule have
worked both sides of the street. See Kamisar, supra
note 49, at 175-76, 177 n. 62.

74See, e.g., Foote, The FourthAmendment: Obstacle or
Necessity in the Law of Arrest? 51 J. CRas. L., C. &
P.S. 402, 406 (1960); Note, PhiladelphiaPolice Practice
and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182, 1195,

1197-98, 1201-02, 1205-06 (1952).
If Illinois had adopted the McNabb-Mallory rule,
criticism to the effect that the rule regards the "overzealous officer" or the "blundering constable" as a
greater danger than the unpunished criminal would
have been likely, but, until quite recently, most
inappropriate. Until it came to the attention of the
courts a short time ago, Chicago Police Department
Rule No. 465 baldly asserted that the requirement of
promptly bringing an arrestee before a judge or magistrate "does not apply when the offender is a well-known
criminal who is held pending investigation." "Thus an
officer of the executive branch-a policeman-was
authorized by police regulations to perform a judicial
function and decide whether the suspect was a 'good
guy' and therefore should receive the benefits of the law,
or he could decide the suspect was a 'bad guy' ... and
make an exception and suspend the operation of the
Constitution and laws of Illinois." Caldwell, Police
Efficiency in Lau, Enforcement as a Foundation of

American Life, 48 A.B.A.J. 130, 132-33 (1962). Mr.
Caldwell also notes that the former Police Commissioner
of Chicago reportedly told the city council's committee
investigating crime that his "policy has always been
... to pick up criminals, simply because they are

criminals" even though "it may be illegal, and I have
received some complaints from the civil liberties group."
Id. at 132. Incidentally, the author of the aforementioned article, Arthur B. Caldwell, is not a "sensitive soul" (Professor Inbau's term for other law professors; see Kamisar, supra note 49, at 173 n. 20), but a
former federal prosecutor for many years who is
currently Chief of the Trial Staff of the Civil Rights
Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
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such acts as nothing more than the performance
of their ordinary duties for which the city employs and pays them.
"We have been compelled to [exclude illegally
seized evidence]... because other remedies
have completely failed to secure compliance
with the Constitutional provisions on the part of
police officers."7 5
The reaction of Chief William Parker of the Los
Angeles Police Department to the adoption of the
exclusionary rule is, I think, typical and most
illuminating:
"It now appears that the Court will approve
the introduction of evidence seized without a
warrant only when the officer bad probable
cause.... Authority to search the person is
apparently limited to the individual for whom
there is probable cause.., and does not include
companions that may be with him.
"The actual commission of a serious criminal
offense will not justify affirmative police action
until such time as the police have armed themselves with sufficient information to constitute
'probable cause'....
"As long as the Exclusionary Rule is the law
of California, your police will respect it and
operate to the best of their ability within the
framework of limitations imposed by that
rule."76
75
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 437-38, 445, 282
P.2d 905, 907, 911 (1955). Judge Traynor, author of the
Cahan opinion, had earlier written an opinion rejecting
the exclusionary rule, People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d
165, 124 P. 2d 44 (1942). He has recently shed further
light on "the education that leads a judge to overrule

himself," Traynor, Mapp v.Ohio at Large in the Fifty

States, 1961 DurE L. J.319, 321-22: "My misgivings
... grew as I observed that time after time [illegally
seized evidence] was being offered as a routine procedure. It became impossible to ignore the corollary that
illegal searches and seizures were also a routine procedure, subject to no effective deterrent; else how could
illegally obtained evidence come into court with such
regularity? It was one thing to condone an occasional
constable's blunder.... It was quite another to condone a steady course of illegal police procedures.... It
is a large assumption that the police have invariably
exhausted the possibilities of obtaining evidence legally
when they have relied upon illegally obtained evidence.
It is more rational to assume the opposite when the
offer of illegally obtained evidence becomes routine."
76PARKER, PoLicE" 115-16, 117, 131 (Vilson ed.
1957). See the discussion in Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig
Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and

FederalCourts, 43 MrNu.

L. Rv.1083, 1153-54 (1959);

Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the
Police, 52 J.CaRm L., C. & P.S. 255 (1961).
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Of course, the "framework of limitations" was
imposed by the state and federal constitutional
guarantees, not the exclusionary rule. Of course, so
long as the state and federal constitutions were
operative, a criminal offense never justified "affirmative police action" unless and -until there was
"sufficient information to constitute 'probable
cause.'" The police react to the adoption of the
exclusionary rule as if the guarantees against
unreasonable search and seizure had just been
written! They talk as if and act as if the exclusionary rule were the guaranty against unreasonable
search and seizure. Why shouldn't the courts?
STATISTICS, TESTIMONY AND T=E FORcE OF

"SIMPLE LOGIC"

In my earlier article in this Journal, I dwelt at
considerable length on statistics and law enforcement testimony regarding the impact of rules of
evidence on crime rates and police-prosecution
efficiency. I did so in response to the charge that
proponents of the exclusionary rules do not like to
look at and talk about these "facts."7 7 Consequently, as Professor Inbau has observed, my
article turned out to be a good deal longer than his
speech which brought it into being. Perhaps it was
too long. For I must confess that when I read Professor Inbau's "reply" to me, I sometimes had the
uncomfortable feeling that he hadn't quite read the
whole article.
For example, I pointed out that three years after
Mallory was handed down, United States Attorney
Oliver Gasch reported "Mallory questions, that is
to say, confessions or admissions, are of controlling
importance in probably less than 5 % of our criminal prosecutions," that "reliance upon confessions
generally has been minimized" and "the accumulation of other evidentiary material.., become
standard operating procedure," 78 that the Washington, D.C., Police Department had testified that
since Mallory was decided: (a) the District's solution rate had remained "nearly double" the national average; (b) indeed, the District's overall
percentage of major crime solutions had increased;
(c) specifically, the percentage had risen in cases
of aggravated assault from 84.3 to 88; in robbery
from 61.3 to 65; in housebreaking, from 50.5 to 54
InSee Kamisar, supra note 49, at 184. (The charge
was made by Chief William Parker of the Los Angeles
Police Department.)
n Kamisar, supra note 49, at 192.

per cent.79 How does Professor Inbau reply to all
this?
He tells us: "In communities such as Washington, D.C., most serious crimes will remain unsolved if the police are not permitted to interrogate
criminal suspects. To prohibit police interrogation-which, in effect, is what the McNabb-Mallory
rule does-means, therefore, that fewer crimes
will be solved and successfully prosecuted." 80 No
documentation. No attempt to refute the testimony of the high ranking law enforcement officers
I quoted. No attempt to explain away the statistics they presented.
Take another example. After wrestling with the
problem for several years, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia dismissed the suggestion that the McNabb-Mallory rule affected the
crime rate as "much too speculative."'" Indeed,
the District's incidence of rapes, aggravated assaults, and grand larcency was lower in 1960 than
in 1950. During this period, Maryland and Virginia
had neither the McNabb-Mallory rule nor the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases; District
law enforcement officers, of course, were "handcuffed" by both. Nevertheless, on a per 100,000
population basis, the District's overall felony rate
increased a mere one per cent as against 69 per
cent for the three Maryland and Virginia suburbs
for which generally complete figures were available,
and as against a nation-wide increase for the
seven major offenses of 66 per cent.u2 How does
Professor Inbae reply to all this?
As a result of the McNabb-Mallory rule, he informs us, "More criminals will remain at large, to
commit other offenses. At the same time the deterrent effect of apprehension and conviction will be
lost insofar as other potential offenders are concerned. The crime rate is bound to be greater under
such circumstances, and I do not feel the need of
statistics to support that conclusion."u3 Once
again, Professor Inbau is unburdened by documentation and untroubled by the need to explain
away the other fellow's.
Professor Inbau, it develops, need not deal with
statistics or police-prosecution testimony because
he has "simple logic" on his side. "[Slimple logic,"
he points out, "is available to support the proposition that the McNabb-Mfallory rule does, and is
79 Id.

at 191-92.

80Inbau, supra note 24, at 331.
81Kamisar, supra note 49, at 187.
8

2Id. at 185:
Inbau, supra note 49, at 331.
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bound to have a crippling effect upon law enforcement in any metropolitan jurisdiction saddled with
the rule."8 4 Again, no attempt to square this view
with the Washington, D.C., experience.
Doesn't "simple logic" end, or stand in need of
considerable revision, when experience to the contrary begins? Isn't this "simple logic"?
I think Profesor Inbau has stymied me at last.
I mean, when somebody issues a warning in 1957
8 Id. at 331. (Emphasis added)
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that a bloody revolution or widespread depression
is going to occur in 1958 or 1959, he may or may
not be right. His logic may or may not be sound.
You can argue about it. But if this same person insists in the year 1962 that these events did take
place in 1958 or 1959 and turns his back on you
and walks off in a huff-chanting "simple logic,
simple logic"-when you try to establish that they
never happened,what do you do then? Where do you
go from there?

